توانایی مدیران و ساختار بدهی: شواهدی از محیط گزارشگری مالی ایران (مقاله علمی وزارت علوم)
درجه علمی: نشریه علمی (وزارت علوم)
آرشیو
چکیده
سیاست های تأمین مالی که مدیران اتخاذ می کنند، نقش مهمی در ریسک و ایجاد ثروت برای سهام داران دارد؛ بنابراین، شناخت عوامل مؤثر در تصمیم های تأمین مالی مدیران اهمیت بسیار دارد؛ ازاین رو هدف این پژوهش بررسی تأثیر توانایی مدیران بر استفاده از بدهی های کوتاه مدت باتوجه به نقش تعدیلگر محدودیت مالی و کیفیت گزارشگری مالی است. شرکت های پذیرفته شده در بورس اوراق بهادار تهران به عنوان جامعه آماری این پژوهش در نظر گرفته شده است و تعداد 100 شرکت در بازه زمانی 1391 لغایت 1401 با استفاده از روش غربالگری به عنوان نمونه انتخاب شد. برای آزمون فرضیه های پژوهش از الگوی رگرسیون چندمتغیره مبتنی بر داده های ترکیبی و روش حداقل مربعات تعمیم یافته استفاده شده است. یافته های پژوهش نشان داد که توانایی مدیران بر سررسید بدهی ها تأثیر مثبت دارد؛ علاوه براین، محدودیت مالی بر رابطه توانایی مدیران و سررسید بدهی تأثیر ندارد؛ درنهایت یافته ها نشان داد که در شرکت های دارای کیفیت گزارشگری بالاتر، نقش توانایی مدیران در استفاده از بدهی های کوتاه مدت پررنگ تر است. مدیران با توانایی بالا که دارای دانش تجاری برتر با انگیزه های قوی برای برقراری ارتباط با توانایی برتر خود هستند، تمایل دارند تا از نسبت بیشتری از بدهی های کوتاه مدت استفاده کنند؛ درنتیجه عدم تقارن اطلاعاتی را کاهش می دهند و شهرت خود را تقویت می کنند.Managers' Ability and Debt Structure: Evidence from Iran's Financial Reporting Environment
The financing policies implemented by managers play a pivotal role in risk management and shareholder wealth creation. Consequently, identifying the factors that influence managerial financing decisions is critically important. This study examines the impact of managerial ability on short-term debt usage, incorporating the moderating effects of financial constraints and financial reporting quality. The sample includes 100 firms listed on the Tehran Stock Exchange, selected through systematic elimination for the period 2012–2023. A multivariate regression model based on panel data analysis was employed to test the hypotheses. The findings demonstrate that managerial ability has a positive effect on debt maturity. Additionally, while financial constraints do not significantly moderate this relationship, financial reporting quality strengthens the influence of managerial ability on short-term debt utilization. Specifically, high-ability managers—equipped with superior business acumen and strong incentives to signal their competence—tend to employ greater short-term debt to mitigate information asymmetry and enhance their reputational capital. Keywords: Debt Structure, Managers' Ability, Financial Constraints, Financial Reporting Quality JEL Classification: M40, H63, D04, M41 Introduction Debt financing is a fundamental component of corporate capital structure, playing a crucial role in firm sustainability and growth. The composition of debt—particularly its maturity structure—serves as a key determinant of financial stability and long-term success. Consequently, decisions regarding debt structure are critical, as misjudgments can expose firms to financial distress or even bankruptcy. Prior research has examined various determinants of debt maturity structure, including macroeconomic and institutional factors such as financial and political environments, legal and tax systems, information asymmetry, and capital provider characteristics. Another stream of literature focuses on firm-specific influences, particularly managerial traits, given their significance in mitigating agency conflicts between shareholders and managers. Among these traits, managerial ability stands out as a pivotal factor shaping debt maturity decisions. Aligned with theoretical foundations, this study proposes the following hypotheses: H ₁ : Managerial ability positively influences debt maturity. H ₂ : Financial constraints attenuate the effect of managerial ability on debt maturity. H ₃ : Financial reporting quality amplifies the impact of managerial ability on debt maturity.Materials & Methods and data The study examines firms listed on the Tehran Stock Exchange (TSE) over the period 2012–2023. The sample was selected through systematic elimination to ensure data integrity and representativeness. To test the hypotheses, we employed panel regression analysis using the Generalized Least Squares (GLS) estimator, which accounts for heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation in the data. Managerial ability was operationalized following Demerjian et al. (2012), while financial reporting quality was measured using the Dechow and Dichev (2002) accruals quality model. Finding The empirical results demonstrate several key insights. As presented in Table 2, managerial ability exhibits a statistically significant positive relationship with firms' utilization of short-term debt. This finding aligns with theoretical expectations, as short-term debt instruments can serve as effective mechanisms to mitigate information asymmetry between managers and investors. Moreover, the preferential use of short-term debt may function as a positive market signal, conveying managers' confidence in the firm's near-term financial prospects. Table 3 reveals that financial constraints do not significantly moderate the relationship between managerial ability and debt maturity structure. This suggests that capable managers maintain their influence over financing decisions regardless of external financial limitations. Finally, Table 4 presents evidence that financial reporting quality strengthens the positive association between managerial ability and short-term debt usage. This amplification effect likely occurs because high-quality financial reporting enhances transparency, thereby increasing the credibility of managers' financing decisions. Discussion and Conclusion Corporate financing decisions are predominantly shaped by managerial discretion, with short-term debt instruments gaining increasing prominence over the past three decades. Our findings align with signaling theory, which posits that short-term debt issuance serves dual purposes: it reduces information asymmetry while simultaneously functioning as a positive market signal of managerial competence. Conversely, agency theory would predict an inverse relationship, suggesting that higher managerial ability might correlate with reduced short-term debt due to inherent agency conflicts in firms where managerial capabilities are less observable. The empirical evidence supports the signaling perspective, demonstrating that high-ability managers strategically utilize short-term debt to distinguish themselves from their less competent counterparts. This behavior stems from their superior capacity to assess market conditions and capitalize on favorable financing opportunities. Furthermore, our analysis reveals that managerial ability plays a particularly significant role in firms with higher reporting quality. In such organizations, which typically possess more robust project portfolios, short-term debt issuance serves as an additional quality indicator. High-ability managers in these firms are more inclined to employ short-term debt instruments, thereby reinforcing their reputation for financial acumen and strengthening market confidence. These findings contribute to the ongoing theoretical discourse by reconciling competing perspectives from signaling and agency theories. They also offer practical implications for corporate governance, suggesting that boards should consider managerial ability as a key factor in financing policy decisions, particularly in firms with transparent financial reporting environments.
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