Theosophia Islamica

Philosophical inquiry into practical matters, similar to theoretical views, has been a subject of investigation by Islamic thinkers. The viewpoints of Muslim wise men (hakims) regarding the nature of practical reason and propositions based on it have varied. Some of them, like Avicenna, Khwaja Nasir al-Din Tusi, and Allameh Tabataba'i, consider practical reason propositions to be of the type of "mashhurat" (common opinions) and "e'tebariyat" (Conventionalities) among humankind, positing no reality beyond them. Therefore, they deem practical rational insights unusable in demonstrative arguments. Others, such as Mulla Hadi Sabzevari, Lahiji, and Mohammad Baqir Sadr, emphasize the certainty and reality of these propositions and believe that practical reason propositions can be used in demonstration. This article, using a descriptive-analytical method, re-examines the views of some hakims and theologians to contribute to the understanding of the identity of practical reason and the philosophy of ethics among Islamic thinkers.

Aristotle and Mulla Sadra have similar approaches to acquiring moral virtues. The three main ethical approaches are virtue ethics, deontology, and consequentialism. Mulla Sadra, while accepting Aristotelian virtue-centeredness and moderation as the manifestation of true virtue, completes it and reveals the nature of true virtue. True virtue is of the genus of knowledge and belongs to the highest part of human identity, namely, the theoretical intellect. Moderation in practical reason provides the necessary ground for attaining the true virtue of theoretical wisdom. The final flourishing of the theoretical intellect is achieved by knowing the highest stage of unity. Both thinkers emphasize the acquisition of all moral virtues and the completion of all dimensions of human identity. Mulla Sadra considers all virtues, even moderation, to be preliminary, viewing true virtue as the theoretical intellect's knowledge of the high stage of unity. The teacher of philosophers (Aristotle), however, while also focusing on theoretical wisdom, considers all virtues related to human perfections as true virtues and does not accept the deprivation of any of them. In this paper, the author aims to integrate Aristotle's holistic approach with Mulla Sadra's monism using an analytical method and to explain this process in order to provide a more complete depiction of ethical virtue-centeredness. The data collection method for this paper is library-based, and the research method is descriptive-analytical, which are methods of qualitative research.

Meaningfulness and meaninglessness are new philosophical problems confronting philosophers. Islamic philosophy, especially Transcendent Theosophy (Hikmat Muta'aliyah), as a philosophy concerned with identifying the truths of the world, is no exception and must offer a response to this issue. The aim of the present research was to reconstruct the viewpoint of Transcendent Theosophy on this problem using a descriptive-analytical method. Based on the principles of Transcendent Theosophy, the findings of the research can be explained as follows: Transcendent Theosophy considers meaningfulness and meaninglessness as philosophical second intelligibles (ma'qūlāt-e thāniyah falsafī) that can be abstracted from human life, and the goals present in human life lead to the abstraction of these concepts. Sadraian wisdom claims that the more real and harmonious the goals are with human life, the more meaningful human life will be. The solution proposed by Transcendent Theosophy in this regard is to return to human primordial nature and to redefine monotheistic goals and eternal life for humanity, as these concepts contribute to the meaningfulness of human life.

Descartes never explicitly discusses linguistics. We owe the very notion of "Descartes' linguistics" to the investigations of Noam Chomsky, an American philosopher of language. Chomsky infers from Descartes' direct and indirect references to language that, from Descartes' perspective, language is, firstly, innate, secondly, originates from the individual rather than society, and thirdly, is a creative, not mechanical, act. This paper, employing a descriptive-analytical method and framed as a critique, aims to clarify and analyze a specific facet of Cartesian thought. It concludes that language, as Descartes could have described it, is subjectivist, and this approach presupposes the possibility of a private language. In essence, the individual and subjective nature of language necessitates accepting a private language. However, a private language has self-destructive implications, providing grounds for serious critiques of Descartes' linguistic view (as extracted by Chomsky).

This article examines Wittgenstein's teachings on realism and anti-realism through the lens of his philosophy of language. Realism posits that every linguistic statement is either true or false, independent of human consciousness and knowledge. Consequently, the Principle of Bivalence—accepting only truth and falsity as semantic values—is central to this view. In contrast, anti-realism rejects this principle, asserting that the truth or falsity of statements can only be determined if empirical or epistemic evidence is available, and statements cannot be evaluated independently of mind and language. Wittgenstein challenges both perspectives by critiquing the foundations of language and focusing on its functions within various contexts of life. He views language not as a passive mirror of reality, but as a constitutive agent within which reality takes shape. This article elucidates Wittgenstein's arguments against the notion of realism and utilizes Dummett's analyses of meaning and truth to clarify the anti-realist foundations in Wittgenstein's philosophy of language.

This article, using a descriptive-analytical method, aims to articulate the epistemological rupture of Mulla Sadra's theory of the soul from that of the Peripatetic philosophers. We begin by critically examining the theories of the soul and sense perception in Aristotle and Avicenna, then delve into Mulla Sadra's intellectual leap on this topic. We'll demonstrate how a transformation in this theory also leads to a revolution in the theory of knowledge of the external world. In general, regarding the discussion of perceptions and knowledge, Mulla Sadra rejects all previous theories, which include: The critique of knowledge being quidditative and the theory of correspondence between knowledge and the known, The critique of knowledge being a psychic quality, The critique of the theory of abstracting the form of the external object in the mind, The critique of knowledge being a mental form and an addition. One of Mulla Sadra's unique conclusions in his theory of the soul is the power of actualization and inventiveness of the mental form. From his perspective, the soul is the agent and creator of sense and imaginative forms. Therefore, it must be stated that with this view, the relationship between forms and the soul is one of action to agent, not one of acceptance to recipient. As Mulla Sadra would assert, just as God emanates creation, we too emanate our knowledge in the form of mental images from within.