درخت حوزه‌های تخصصی

In the course of the 20 th century, Islamic human rights Instruments and documents have been issued as a result of conferences of Muslim scholars, sometimes through exchange of opinions with European human rights experts, and initiated by different Muslim countries. On the whole, these instruments/ documents have been mostly welcomed on the international level; partly they were the result of intercultural and interreligious dialogue. On the one hand, international experts on human rights became aware of the rich heritage of Islam in terms of collective and individual rights - on the other hand, the question arose if and to what extent the Islamic corpus of rights – enshrined in the Sharia’s – can be in accordance with the International Declaration of Human Rights of 1948. Islamic scholars as well as western human rights experts, both from their perspective, have analysed which differences or communalities exist, what their roots are and how they may influence the legal status of people in an Islamic or Eastern or Western context. The aim of such scientific approach should be to ensure that human beings have access to guaranteed rights and can expect protection when exercising those rights. In this paper I will try to present an overview on relevant discussions and developments, based on literature.  

The traditional anthropocentric understanding of human rights is undergoing a profound re-evaluation in contemporary legal discourse. While historically focused on the individual human being, recent developments in international and regional human rights law reveal a nascent yet significant trend towards extending rights and protections to non-human entities. This article examines the legal basis and implications of recognizing "rights of nature" and considering the human rights dimensions of artificial intelligence, arguing that these emerging subjects challenge and reshape foundational concepts within human rights law. Abstract: The traditional anthropocentric understanding of human rights is undergoing a profound re-evaluation in contemporary legal discourse. While historically focused on the individual human being, recent developments in international and regional human rights law reveal a nascent yet significant trend towards extending rights and protections to non-human entities. This article examines the legal basis and implications of recognizing "rights of nature" and considering the human rights dimensions of artificial intelligence, arguing that these emerging subjects challenge and reshape foundational concepts within human rights law. Abstract: The traditional anthropocentric understanding of human rights is undergoing a profound re-evaluation in contemporary legal discourse. While historically focused on the individual human being, recent developments in international and regional human rights law reveal a nascent yet significant trend towards extending rights and protections to non-human entities. This article examines the legal basis and implications of recognizing "rights of nature" and considering the human rights dimensions of artificial intelligence, arguing that these emerging subjects challenge and reshape foundational concepts within human rights law.

Despite UNCLOS serving as the primary legal framework governing maritime conduct, challenges remain in effectively embedding human rights principles, ethical governance and inclusivity within its implementation, especially in geopolitically sensitive regions such as Malay Indo Archipelago. This raises the question of how fundamental legal traditions, such as those found in 15 th century Undang-Undang Melaka, a customary maritime code emphasizing human dignity, ethical conducts, and inclusive community governance- can highly inform and enrich contemporary international maritime law. The problem lies in the apparent disconnect between modern state centered ethical governance regimes and the human centered ethical governance principles that underpin long lasting peace. This study critically examines how the human right norms embedded in the Undang- Undang Melaka align with or differ from those in UNCLOS, arguing that the incorporation of these ethical and inclusive governance principle is crucial for fostering maritime cooperation, trust, and ultimately geopolitical peace. By exploring these normative intersections through a qualitative legal analysis, the research aims to demonstrate that the revitalization of customary law’s humanistic maritime governance, promoting more equitable and peaceful relations among maritime states. 

This research focuses on analyzing the extent of Muhammadiyah's role in translating the human rights narrative and its relationship with Sharia principles, which are the guidelines in its movement to protect vulnerable groups of victims of human rights violations in Indonesia. Through Al-Ma'un theology, Muhammadiyah has transformed the discourse of human rights within religious contexts but also in practical efforts to protect vulnerable groups of victims of structural human rights violations and victims of national strategic projects, such as in the Wadas andesite mining case, the Rempang Eco-city case, the Pakel agrarian conflict case, the Trenggalek gold mining case, and various other cases. This research seeks to answer the following questions: (1) To what extent does Muhammadiyah play a role in disseminating human rights discourse in Indonesia? (2) How can the model of protecting vulnerable communities affected by human rights violations by Muhammadiyah be a best practice for the protection of human rights and also for the movement of civil society in the Eastern States? This research employs a socio-legal approach to identify struggles in defending the rights of vulnerable groups in Indonesia. Through an examination of its organizational pronouncements, advocacy initiatives, and grassroots activities, this paper explores the extent to which Muhammadiyah actively contributes to the protection and promotion of human rights for vulnerable populations in Indonesia, highlighting both its potential and its limitations in navigating the intricate landscape of human rights within a predominantly Muslim nation. Ultimately, this research contributes to a nuanced understanding of the role of Islamic civil society organizations in shaping and implementing human rights agendas in Indonesia and beyond.

Human rights, grounded in the protection of human dignity, have a normative nature transformed the traditional structure of citizenship rights. This transformation has extended citizenship rights into the realm of international law. Consequently, citizenship rights and their associated concepts are now defined more by universal human rights laws than by the national interests of states. This process suggests that human rights serve as a primary principle, governing over citizenship rights. It also implies that, through developments in the theoretical foundations of citizenship, there may be a need to revise state constitutions or demand narrow or broad interpretations of constitutional laws. The procedures of the International Court of Justice, including its efforts to redefine nationality and citizenship and to identify the customary law of international law in terms of human rights requirements, reflect this transformation. Accordingly, the traditional definitions of citizenship and related concepts, such as nationality, are evolving, highlighting the need for new interpretations. A reinterpretation of citizenship rights, informed by human rights values, suggests a shift in the legal principles that govern the traditional perspective on citizenship.

This article investigates the foundational role of philosophical anthropology in shaping social, legal, and political theories across both Islamic and Western intellectual traditions. It argues that any theory in human sciences is necessarily rooted in an underlying conception of the human being. Drawing upon Aristotle’s fourfold causality-efficient, final, material, and formal causes-the article demonstrates that philosophical anthropology is not merely a background assumption but the structural core of theory formation. The study has hired an analytical and intellectual method, systematically examining the internal logic of philosophical texts and ideas to identify how anthropological premises inform broader theoretical architectures.Through a comparative case study of Abu Nasr al-Farabi and Karl Marx, the article illustrates how divergent anthropologies—metaphysical and teleological in the former, materialist and historical in the latter—give rise to distinct visions of society and governance. Al-Farabi’s conception of the rational soul and hierarchical faculties grounds his model of the virtuous city (Utopia) , while Marx’s notion of the human as a laboring, self-transforming species-being underlies his critique of capitalism and vision of emancipation. Despite methodological and cultural differences, both thinkers reveal that social and political systems are ultimately constructed upon philosophical understandings of human nature. By centering  philosophical anthropology at the middle of interdisciplinary inquiry, the article calls for a renewed focus on the human essence as the necessary starting point for reforming or generating coherent knowledge systems in the humanities and social sciences.

This article examines the legality of Israel’s claim to a right of preemptive self-defense against Iran within the framework of international law. It argues that such a claim lacks any valid legal foundation and stands in stark contrast to the fundamental principles enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations as well as established international jurisprudence. According to Article 51 of the UN Charter, the use of force in self-defense is only permissible in response to an actual and verifiable armed attack. Any military action based solely on the anticipation or assumption of an imminent threat does not meet the legal threshold and is not recognized by the international legal order. The International Court of Justice (ICJ), in landmark cases such as Nicaragua (1986), the Advisory Opinion on the Wall (2004), and Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Uganda (2005), has consistently adopted a narrow interpretation of self-defense, explicitly rejecting the doctrine of preemptive force. Israel’s assertion of facing a permanent threat from Iran, absent concrete evidence of an imminent armed attack, cannot serve as a lawful justification for the use of force. Such actions not only contravene the prohibition on the use of force and the principle of state sovereignty but may also constitute a breach of peremptory norms of international law (jus cogens) and amount to an act of aggression. Furthermore, acceptance of such a precedent poses serious challenges to the maintenance of international peace and security and risks undermining the credibility of the global legal order. Drawing on authoritative sources, international instruments, and comparative legal analysis, the article concludes that Israel’s invocation of preemptive self-defense is legally unfounded and incompatible with contemporary international law.